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Abstract. Instantaneous non-local quantum computation requires mul-
tiple parties to jointly perform a quantum operation, using pre-shared
entanglement and a single round of simultaneous communication. We
study this task for its close connection to position-based quantum cryptog-
raphy, but it also has natural applications in the context of foundations of
quantum physics and in distributed computing. The best known general
construction for instantaneous non-local quantum computation requires
a pre-shared state which is exponentially large in the number of qubits
involved in the operation, while efficient constructions are known for very
specific cases only.
We partially close this gap by presenting new schemes for efficient in-
stantaneous non-local computation of several classes of quantum circuits,
using the Clifford+T gate set. Our main result is a protocol which uses
entanglement exponential in the T-depth of a quantum circuit, able to per-
form non-local computation of quantum circuits with a (poly-)logarithmic
number of layers of T gates with quasi-polynomial entanglement. Our
proofs combine ideas from blind and delegated quantum computation
with the garden-hose model, a combinatorial model of communication
complexity which was recently introduced as a tool for studying certain
schemes for quantum position verification. As an application of our re-
sults, we also present an efficient attack on a recently-proposed scheme
for position verification by Chakraborty and Leverrier.
1 Introduction
We study the task of instantaneous non-local quantum computation, and present
new protocols to efficiently perform this task for specific classes of quantum
circuits. Our main motivation comes from position-based quantum cryptography,
where previous attacks on schemes for position-based quantum cryptography
have taken either of two forms:
First results on quantum position-based cryptography involved attacks on
specific proposals for schemes, such as the attacks by Lau and Lo [31], those by
Kent, Munro and Spiller [28], and the attack on Beigi and Ko¨nig’s scheme using
mutually-unbiased-bases [37]. A certain family of efficient attacks on a concrete
class of single-qubit schemes [13] was formalized by the garden-hose model.
Described as ‘fast protocols for bipartite unitary operators’, Yu, Griffiths and
Cohen [40,39] give protocols that, although not directly inspired by position-based
quantum cryptography, can be translated to our setting.
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On the other hand Buhrman et al. [12] constructed a general attack which
treats the quantum functionality of the protocol to be attacked as a black box.
For a protocol which uses a message of n qubits, the entanglement consumption
of this attack is around 2log (
1
ε )2
4n
EPR pairs, doubly exponential in n. Here ε
represents the probability that the attack does not succeed. The construction of
Buhrman et al. was based on a protocol for ‘instantaneous non-local measurement’
by Vaidman [38,16]. Beigi and Ko¨nig [5] later constructed a more efficient general
attack, using port-based teleportation – a new teleportation method introduced
by Ishizaka and Hiroshima [25,26]. The improved attack uses O(n 2
8n
ε2 ) EPR pairs,
still an exponential dependence on n.
These protocols were able to solve the following task. Given a constant ε ≥ 0
and an n-qubit quantum operation1 U , where n is a natural number. Two
players, Alice and Bob, receive an arbitrary input state ρAB of n qubits, with the
players receiving n/2 qubits each. After a single round of simultaneous quantum2
communication, the players must output a state ε-close to UρABU
†. Alice outputs
the first n/2 qubits of the state and Bob outputs the other n/2 qubits. We define
INQCε(U) as the smallest number of EPR pairs that the players have to share at
the start of a protocol which performs this task. INQC(U) is used as a shorthand
for INQC0(U), a protocol which works with no error. We present a more precise
definition of INQC is presented in Appendix A.
In this work we partially bridge the gap between efficient specific construc-
tions for instantaneous non-local computation and expensive general ones, by
constructing a protocol for non-local computation of a unitary transformation U
such that the entanglement use of the protocol depends on the quantum circuit
which describes U .
In particular, writing quantum circuits over the Clifford+T gate set, we create
a protocol using entanglement exponential in the T-count. We also present a
protocol that uses an amount of entanglement which scales as the number of
qubits n raised to the power of the T-depth of the circuit. Even though this is
a quickly-growing dependence, for circuits of constant T-depth this amounts to
a polynomial dependence on n, unlike any earlier construction. For circuits of
polylogarithmic T-depth we obtain an amount of entanglement which is quasi-
polynomial in n, i.e. a dependence of the form 2(logn)
c
for some constant c.
Note that the depth and size of the quantum circuit can be much higher than
its T-depth: we allow an arbitrary number of gates from the Clifford group in
addition to the limited number of T gates. Our results imply new efficient attacks
1 Our constructions only consider unitaries given by quantum circuits, but the task
naturally extends to more general quantum operations. The motivation for Vaidman’s
original scheme [38], which formed the basis of Buhrman et al.’s construction, was
to instantaneously perform a non-local measurement. Our constructions can also be
applied to that case, by writing the measurement as a unitary operation followed by
a measurement in the computational basis.
2 Since restriction to classical communication is not necessarily dictated by the appli-
cation in position-based quantum cryptography, we allow quantum communication.
All presented protocols work equally well when all messages are classical instead.
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on any scheme for position-verification where the action of the honest party can
be written as a low T-depth quantum circuit.
Linking blind quantum computation and instantaneous non-local quantum
computation was first considered by Broadbent3 [8], who considered a setting
where the parties have access to non-local boxes – correlations even stronger
than those allowed by quantum mechanics. The techniques we use are also
based on delegated and blind quantum computation [15,4,18,19,7] and results
on computation via teleportation [24], but we combine them with new ideas
from the garden-hose model [13,29] – a recently-introduced combinatorial model
for communication complexity with close links to a specific class of schemes for
position verification.
We prove two main theorems, each improving on the entanglement con-
sumption of the best-known previous constructions for non-local instantaneous
quantum computation for specific circuits4. Additionally, we use our proof method
to construct a new attack on a scheme for position verification which was recently
proposed by Chakraborty and Leverrier [14].
Theorem 1. Any n-qubit Clifford+T quantum circuit C which has at most
k T gates has a protocol for instantaneous non-local computation using O(n2k)
EPR pairs.
Theorem 2. Any n-qubit quantum circuit C using the Clifford+T gate set
which has T-depth d, has a protocol for instantaneous non-local computation
using O( (68n)d ) EPR pairs.
The main technical tool we use in the proof of our depth-dependent construction
is the following lemma, which is able to remove a conditionally-applied gate
from the Clifford group without any communication – at an entanglement cost
which scales with the garden-hose complexity of the function which describes the
condition.
Lemma 3. Let f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a function known to all
parties, and let GH (f) be the garden-hose complexity of the function f . Assume
Alice has a single qubit with state Pf(x,y)|ψ〉, for binary strings x, y ∈ {0, 1}n,
where Alice knows the string x and Bob knows y. The following two statements
hold:
1. There exists an instantaneous protocol without any communication which
uses 2GH (f) pre-shared EPR pairs after which a chosen qubit of Alice is in
the state Xg(xˆ,yˆ)Yh(xˆ,yˆ)|ψ〉. Here xˆ depends only on x and the 2GH (f) bits
that describe the measurement outcomes of Alice, and yˆ depends on y and
the measurement outcomes of Bob.
2. The garden-hose complexities of the functions g and h are at most linear
in the garden-hose complexity of the function f . More precisely, GH (g) ≤
4GH (f) + 1 and GH (h) ≤ 11GH (f) + 2.
3 These results were first available as privately-circulated notes in December 2011, and
were made available online in December 2015.
4 From now on, whenever we write ‘quantum circuit’, we will always mean a quantum
circuit that only uses the Clifford group generators, together with T gates.
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Chakraborty and Leverrier [14] recently proposed a protocol for quantum position
verification on the interleaved multiplication of unitaries. They show that all
known attacks, applied to this protocol, require entanglement exponential in the
number of terms t in the product. As an application of Lemma 3, we present an
attack on their proposed protocol which has entanglement cost polynomial in t
and the number of qubits n. The new attack requires an amount of entanglement
which scales as ( tε )
O(1) per qubit, and for each qubit succeeds with probability
at least 1− ε.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Pauli matrices and the Clifford group
The single-qubit Pauli matrices are X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Y =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
,
and the identity I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
. A Pauli operator on an n-qubit state is the tensor
product of n one-qubit Pauli matrices, the group of n qubit Pauli operators5
is P = {σ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σn | ∀j : σj ∈ {I,X, Y, Z}} × {±1,±i}. These are some of
the simplest quantum operations and appear, for example, as corrections for
standard quantum teleportation.
The Clifford group can be defined as those operations that take elements of
the Pauli group to other elements of the Pauli group under conjugation – the
normalizer of the Pauli group. We consider the Clifford group on n qubits, for
some natural number n.
C = {U ∈ U(2n) | ∀σ : σ ∈ P =⇒ UσU† ∈ P} (1)
Notable elements of the Clifford group are the single-qubit gates given by the
Hadamard matrix H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
and the phase gate P =
(
1 0
0 i
)
, and the
two-qubit CNOT gate given by CNOT =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
.
The set {H,P,CNOT} generates the Clifford group up to a global phase when
applied to arbitrary qubits, see e.g. [23]. For all these gates, we will use subscripts
to indicate the qubits or wires to which they are applied; e.g. Hj is a Hadamard
gate applied to the j-th wire, and CNOTj,k is a CNOT that has wire j as control
and k as target.
Even though there exist interesting quantum circuits that use only gates from
the Clifford group, it is not a universal set of gates. Indeed, the Gottesman–Knill
5 The given definition includes a global phase, which is not important when viewing
the elements as quantum gates.
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states that such a circuit can be efficiently simulated by a classical computer,
something which is not known to be true for general quantum circuits [22,1].
By extending C with any gate, we do obtain a gate-set which is universal for
quantum computation [32].
The gate we will use to extend the Clifford gates to a universal set is the T
gate, sometimes called pi/8-gate or R, defined by T =
(
1 0
0 eipi/4
)
. We will write
all circuits using gates from the set {X,Z,H,P,CNOT,T}. Technically X, P, and
Z are redundant here, since they can be formed by the others as P = T2, Z = P2
and X = ZHZ, but we include them for convenience.
In our protocols for instantaneous non-local computation, we will alternate
teleportation steps with gate operations, and therefore the interaction between
the Pauli matrices and the other gates are especially important. We will make
much use of the following identities, which can all be easily checked6.
XZ = ZX
PZ = ZP
PX = XZP
HX = ZH
HZ = XH
TX = PXT
CNOT1,2(X⊗ I) = (X⊗X)CNOT1,2
CNOT1,2(I⊗X) = (I⊗X)CNOT1,2
CNOT1,2(Z⊗ I) = (Z⊗ I)CNOT1,2
CNOT1,2(I⊗ Z) = (Z⊗ Z)CNOT1,2
(2)
2.2 Key transformations from Clifford circuits
For a 0/1 vector v of length n and for any single-qubit operation U , we write
Uv =
⊗n
j=1 U
vj , i.e., Uv is the application of U on all qubits j ∈ [n] for which
vj = 1. When Alice teleports a state |ψ〉 of n qubits to Bob, the uncorrected
state at Bob’s side can be written as XaxZaz |ψ〉. Here we let ax and az be the
vectors representing the outcomes of the Bell measurements of Alice. In analogy
with the the literature on assisted and blind quantum computation, we will call
the teleportation measurement outcomes ax and az the key needed to decode
|ψ〉.
The specific entries of these keys will often depend on several different mea-
surement outcomes, given by earlier steps in the protocol, and we will therefore
occasionally describe them as polynomials over F2. Viewing the keys as polyno-
mials is especially helpful in the description of the more-complicated protocol of
Section 5.
For any gate from the Clifford group U ∈ C, if we apply U on the encoded
state, we can describe the resulting state as U |ψ〉 with a new key. That is,
UXaxZaz |ψ〉 = X aˆxZ aˆzU |ψ〉 for some new 0/1 keys aˆx, aˆz. The transformations
of the keys will have a particularly simple form. (See for example [11] for a
characterization of these transformations and a different application of Clifford
circuit computation.)
For example, we can write the identities of Equation 2 in terms of key
transformations. The transformations that occur when a bigger Pauli operator
is applied, can then be easily found by writing the Pauli operator in terms of
6 Here equality is up to a global phase – which we will ignore from now on for simplicity.
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its generators {H,P,CNOT}, and applying these rules one-by-one. We will write
(x1, x2 | z1, z2) as a shorthand for, respectively, the X key on the first and second
qubit, and the Z key on the first and second qubit – this is a convenient notation7
for the pair of vectors ax and az that represent these keys. All addition of these
keys will be over F2, i.e., the + represents the binary exclusive or.
P(x | z)→ (x | x+ z)P
H(x | z)→ (z | x)H
CNOT1,2(x1, x2 | z1, z2)→ (x1, x1 + x2 | z1 + z2, z2)CNOT1,2
2.3 Clifford+T quantum circuits, T-count and T-depth
In several different areas of quantum information, gates from the Clifford group
are ‘well-behaved’ or ‘easy’, while the other non-Clifford gates are hard – an
observation which was also made, with several examples, in the recent [10].
The T-count of a quantum circuit is defined as the number of T gates in
the entire quantum circuit. The T-depth is the number of layers of T gates,
when viewing the circuit as alternating between Clifford gates and a layer of
simultaneous T gates. See for example Figure 5.
Given a quantum operation, it is not always obvious what is the best circuit
in terms of T-count or T-depth. Recent work gave algorithms for finding circuits
that are optimized in terms of T-depth [3,21,35,2] and optimal constructions for
arbitrary single-qubit unitaries have also been found [30,34,36]. These construc-
tions sometimes increase the number of qubits involved by adding ancillas—the
use of which can greatly decrease the T-depth of the resulting circuit.
2.4 The garden-hose model
The garden-hose model is a combinatorial model of communication complexity,
first introduced by Buhrman, Fehr, Schaffner and Speelman [13]. The recent
work by Klauck and Podder [29] further investigated the notion, proving several
follow-up results. Here we repeat the basic definitions of the garden-hose model
and its link to attacks on schemes for position-based quantum cryptography.
Alice has an input x ∈ {0, 1}n, Bob has an input y ∈ {0, 1}n, and the players
want to compute a function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} in the following
way. Between the two players are s pipes, and, in a manner depending on their
respective inputs, the players link up these pipes one-to-one with hoses. Alice also
has a water tap, which she can connect to one of these pipes. When f(x, y) = 0,
the water should exit on Alice’s side, and when f(x, y) = 1 we want the water to
exit at Bob’s side. The garden-hose complexity of a function f , written GH (f),
then is the least number s of pre-shared pipes the players need to compute the
function in this manner.
7 This mapping is called the symplectic notation when used in the stabilizer formalism,
although we won’t need to introduce the associated symplectic inner product for our
construction.
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There is a natural translation from strategies of the garden-hose game to a
quantum protocol that routes a qubit to either Alice or Bob depending on their
local inputs, up to teleportation corrections. Consider the following quantum
task, again dependent on a function f like in the previous paragraph. Alice now
receives a quantum state |ψ〉 and a classical input x, Bob receives input y, and
the players are allowed one round of simultaneous communication. If f(x, y) = 0,
Alice must output |ψ〉 after this round of communication, and otherwise Bob
must output |ψ〉. We would like to analyze how much pre-shared entanglement
the players need to perform this task.
From the garden-hose protocol for f , the players can come up with a strategy
for this quantum task that needs at most GH (f) EPR pairs pre-shared. Every
pipe corresponds to an EPR pair. If a player’s garden-hose strategy dictates a
hose between some pipe j and another pipe k, then that player performs a Bell
measurement of EPR-halves labeled j and k. Alice’s connection of the water
tap to a pipe corresponds to a Bell measurement between her input state |ψ〉
and the local half of an EPR pair. After their measurements, the correct player
will hold the state |ψ〉, up to Pauli corrections incurred by the teleportations.
The corrections can be performed after a step of simultaneous communication
containing the outcomes of all measurements.
We will describe some of the logic in terms of the garden-hose model, as
an abstraction away from the qubits involved. When we refer to a quantum
implementation of a garden-hose strategy, we always mean the back-and-forth
teleportation as described above.
The following lemma will prove to be useful. Let the number of spilling pipes
of a garden-hose protocol for a player be the number of possible places the water
could possibly exit. That is, the number of spilling pipes for Alice for a specific x,
is the number of different places the water could exit on her side over all Bob’s
inputs y. The number of spilling pipes for Alice is then the maximum number
of spilling pipes over all x. To be able to chain different parts of a garden-hose
protocol together, it can be very convenient to only have a single spilling pipe
for each player.
Lemma 1 (Lemma 11 of [29]). A garden-hose protocol P for any function
f with multiple spilling pipes can be converted to another garden-hose protocol
P ′ for f that has only one spilling pipe on Alice’s side and one spilling pipe on
Bob’s side. The size of P ′ is at most 3 times the size of P plus 1.
Klauck and Podder also showed that computing the binary XOR of several pro-
tocols is possible with only a linear overhead in total garden-hose complexity [29,
Theorem 18]. We give an explicit construction for this statement in AppendixC –
the result already follows from the similar construction of [29, Lemma 12], except
that we obtain a constant which is slightly better than unfolding their (more
general) proof.
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Lemma 2. Let (f1, f2, . . . , fk) be functions, where each function fi has garden-
hose complexity GH (fi). Let c ∈ {0, 1} be an arbitrary bit. Then,
GH
(
c⊕
k⊕
i=1
fi
)
≤ 4
k∑
i=1
GH (fi) + 1 .
3 Low T-count quantum circuits
C1 C2 Ck Ck+1
T
· · ·
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
Fig. 1. A circuit with T-count k. The Ci gates represent subcircuits consisting only of
operation from the Clifford group C.
Theorem 1. Let C be an n-qubit quantum circuit with gates from the Clifford+T
gate set, and let C contain k T-gates in total. Then INQC(C) ≤ O(n2k), i.e.,
there exists a protocol for two-party instantaneous non-local computation of C
which uses a pre-shared entangled state of O(n2k) EPR pairs.
Proof. Let Alice’s input state be some arbitrary quantum state |ψ0〉. We will
write the quantum state at step t ∈ {0, . . . , k}, as intermediate result of executing
the circuit C for t steps, as |ψt〉. Let Ct be the subcircuit, consisting only of
Clifford gates, between the (t − 1)th and tth T gates. At step t, the circuit
alternates between the Clifford subcircuit Ct and a T-gate on some wire wt which
we write as Twt , that is, we define Twt = I
⊗wt−1 ⊗ T⊗ I⊗n−wt−1.
Because of the nature of the setting, all steps are done instantaneously unless
noted otherwise, without waiting for a message of the other party. For example,
if the description mentions that one party teleports a qubit, we can instantly
describe the qubit as ‘being on the other side’, but the other party will act on
the uncorrected qubit, since the communication will only happen afterwards and
simultaneously.
We first give a high-level description of the protocol. Bob teleports his part
of the state to Alice, who holds the entire state – up to teleportation corrections.
Alice will now apply the first set of Clifford gates, followed by a single T gate. The
teleportation corrections (all known to Bob) determine whether the T gate that
Alice performs creates an unwanted extra P gate on the state. The extra P gate is
created whenever an X correction is present, because of the relation TX = PXT.
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Therefore, even though Alice holds the state, only Bob knows whether the state
has an extra unwanted P gate or not.
To remove the unwanted gate, Alice teleports all n qubits back to Bob, who
corrects the phase gate (if present). The players then perform a garden-hose-like
trick to keep the form of the key simple, at the cost of doubling the total size at
each step.
Now we will give the precise description of the players’ actions:
Step 0 Bob performs a Bell measurement to teleport all his n/2 qubits to Alice,
where we write the needed X-corrections as b0x,i and Z-corrections b
0
z,i, for
i = n/2 + 1, . . . , n. Now, since the qubits Alice already started with don’t
need a correction, we have b0x,i = b
0
z,i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n/2. Then we write
b0x and b
0
z for the 0/1 vector containing the X corrections and Z correction
respectively. The complete state is Xb
0
xZb
0
z |ψ0〉, where all qubits are at Alice’s
side while Bob knows the key.
Step 1.a Alice executes C1 on the (uncorrected) qubits, so that the state now
equals
C1X
b0xZb
0
z |ψ0〉 = Xbˆ1xZbˆ1zC1|ψ0〉 ,
where (bˆ1x, bˆ
1
z) = f1(b
0
x, b
0
z), with f1 : Fn2 × Fn2 → Fn2 × Fn2 is a formula that
consists of relabeling and addition over F2, and that is known to all parties.
Bob knows all the entries of the vectors bˆ1x and bˆ
1
z that contain the new
teleportation corrections.
Step 1.b Alice executes the T gate on the correct wire w1 ∈ {1, . . . , n} of the
uncorrected qubits. Define b1 = bˆ1x,w1 , the w1 entry of the vector bˆ
1
x. The
state in Alice’s possession is now
Tw1X
bˆ1xZbˆ
1
zC1|ψ0〉 = Pb1w1Xbˆ
1
xZbˆ
1
zTw1C1|ψ0〉 = Pb
1
w1X
bˆ1xZbˆ
1
z |ψ1〉 .
That is, besides the presence of the Pauli gates, depending on the teleportation
measurements, the w1 qubit possibly has an extra phase gate that needs to
be corrected before the protocol can continue.
Step 1.c Alice teleports all qubits to Bob, with teleportation outcomes a1x, a
1
z ∈
Fn2 . We will define the a1 as the w1 entry of a1x. Bob then has the state
Xa
1
xZa
1
zPb
1
w1X
bˆ1xZbˆ
1
z |ψ1〉 = Pb1w1Xbˆ
1
xZbˆ
1
zZa
1b1Xa
1
xZa
1
z |ψ1〉 .
Knowing the relevant variables from his measurement outcomes in the previ-
ous steps, Bob performs the operation Xbˆ
1
xZbˆ
1
z (Pb
1
w1)
† to transform the state
to Za
1b1Xa
1
xZa
1
z |ψ1〉.
Step 1.d For this step the players share two sets of n EPR pairs, one set labeled
“b1 = 0”, the other set labeled “b1 = 1”. Bob teleports the state to Alice
using the set corresponding to the value of b1, with teleportation outcomes
b2x and b
2
z.
Step 1.e The set of qubits corresponding to the correct value of b1 are in the
state
Xb
2
xZb
2
xZa
1b1Xa
1
xZa
1
z |ψ1〉 .
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On the set labeled “b1 = 0”, Alice applies Xa
1
xZa
1
z , and on the set labeled
“b1 = 1” Alice applies Xa
1
xZa
1
zZa
1
w1 , so that the state (at the correct set of
qubits) equals Xb
2
xZb
2
z |ψ1〉.
We are now in almost the same situation as before the first step: Alice is in
possession of a state for which Bob completely knows the needed teleportation
corrections – with the difference that Alice does not know which of the two
sets that is.
Steps 2 . . .k The players repeat the protocol from Step 1, but Alice performs
all steps in parallel for all sets of states. The needed resources then double
with each step: two sets for step 2, four for step 3, etc.
Step k+1, final step When having executed this protocol for the entire circuit,
Alice only teleports Bob’s qubits back to him, i.e. the qubits corresponding
to the last n/2 wires, instead of the entire state, so that in the correct groups,
Alice and Bob are in possession of the state |ψk〉 up to simple teleportation
corrections. Then, in their step of simultaneous communication, the players
exchange all teleportation measurement outcomes. After receiving these
measurement outcomes, the players discard the qubits that did not contain
the state, and perform the Pauli corrections on the correct qubits.
The needed EPR pairs for this protocol consist of n/2 for Step 0. Then
every set uses at most 3n pairs: n for the teleportation of Alice to Bob, and
2n for the teleportation back. The t-th step of the circuit starts with 2t−1 sets
of parallel executions, therefore the total entanglement is upper bounded by
n/2 +
∑k
t=1 2
t−13n ≤ 3n2k.
4 Conditional application of phase gate using garden-hose
protocols
The following lemma connects the difficulty of removing an unwanted phase gate
that is applied conditional on a function f , to the garden-hose complexity of
f . This lemma is the main technical tool which we use to non-locally compute
quantum circuits with a dependence on the T-depth.
Lemma 3. Assume Alice has a single qubit with state Pf(x,y)|ψ〉, for binary
strings x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, where Alice knows the string x and Bob knows y. Let GH (f)
be the garden-hose complexity of the function f . The following two statements
hold:
1. There exists an instantaneous protocol without any communication which
uses 2GH (f) pre-shared EPR pairs after which a known qubit of Alice is in
the state Xg(xˆ,yˆ)Yh(xˆ,yˆ)|ψ〉. Here xˆ depends only on x and the 2GH (f) bits
that describe the measurement outcomes of Alice, and yˆ depends on y and
the measurement outcomes of Bob.
2. The garden-hose complexities of the functions g and h are at most linear in
the complexity of the function f . More precisely, GH (g) ≤ 4GH (f) + 1 and
GH (h) ≤ 11GH (f) + 2.
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Proof. To prove the first statement we will construct a quantum protocol that
uses 2GH (f) EPR pairs, which is able to remove the conditional phase gate. The
quantum protocol uses the garden-hose protocol for f as a black box.
For the second part of the statement of the lemma, we construct garden-
hose protocols which are able to compute the teleportation corrections that
were incurred by executing our quantum protocol. By explicitly exhibiting these
protocols, we give an upper bound to the garden-hose complexity of the X
correction g and the Z correction h.
Pf(x,y)|ψ〉
Teleport according to
GH protocol for f
P−1
P−1
P−1
Xg(xˆ,yˆ)Zh(xˆ,yˆ)|ψ〉
GH protocol for f (copy)
Fig. 2. Schematic overview of the quantum protocol to undo the conditionally-present
phase gate on |ψ〉. The solid connections correspond to Bell measurements.
The quantum protocol is shown as Figure 2. Alice and Bob execute the
garden-hose protocol with the state Pf(x,y)|ψ〉, i.e. they teleport the state back
and forth, with the EPR pairs chosen depending on x and y. Afterwards, if
f(x, y) = 0, the qubit will be at one of the unmeasured EPR halves on Alice’s
side, and if f(x, y) = 1 the qubit will be on Bob’s side. The state of the qubit
will be Xg
′(x′,y′) Zh
′(x′,y′) Pf(x,y)|ψ〉 = Pf(x,y)Xg′(x′,y′) Zh′(x′,y′)⊕f(x,y)g′(x′,y′) |ψ〉,
for some functions g′ and h′.
On each qubit on Bob’s side, corresponding with an ‘open pipe’ in the garden-
hose model, Bob applies P−1, so that the state of the qubit is now equal to
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Xg
′(x′,y′) Zh
′(x′,y′)⊕f(x,y)g′(x′,y′) |ψ〉. The exact location of our qubit depends on
the protocol, and is unknown to both players. Here x′ and y′ are the measurement
outcomes of Alice and Bob in this first half of the protocol.
To return the qubit to a known position without an extra communication
step, we employ a trick that uses the reversibility of the garden-hose model.
Alice and Bob repeat the exact same garden-hose strategy, except they leave the
start open, and connect the open ends between the original and the copy. Alice
performs a Bell measurement between the first open qubit in the original, and
the first open qubit in the copy, etc. Bob does the same, after he applied the
P gates. Afterwards, the qubit will be present in the start location, ‘water tap’
in garden-hose terminology, of the copied game, since it has followed the exact
same path backwards. The final state of the qubit now is Xg(xˆ,yˆ) Zh(xˆ,yˆ) |ψ〉, for
some functions g and h and xˆ and yˆ the measurement outcomes of Alice and
Bob respectively. The total entanglement consumption is 2GH (f).
Every measurement corresponds to a connection of two pipes in the garden-
hose model, therefore each player performs at most GH (f) teleportation mea-
surements, of which the outcomes can be described by 2GH (f) bits.
Label the EPR pairs with numbers from {1, 2, . . . , 2GH (f)}, and use the
label 0 for the register holding the starting qubit |ψ〉. Let A be a list of disjoint
pairs of the indices of the EPR pairs that Alice uses for teleportation in this
protocol, and let ax, az ∈ {0, 1}|A| be the bit strings that respectively hold the X
and Z outcomes of the corresponding Bell measurements. Similarly, let B be a
list of the indices of the EPR pairs that Bob uses, and let bx, bz ∈ {0, 1}|B| be
the bit strings that hold the measured X and Z corrections.
To show the second part of the statement, we will construct a garden-hose
protocol which tracks the newly-incurred Pauli corrections from teleporting the
qubit back-and-forth, by following the qubit through the path defined by A
and B.
We will first construct the protocol for the final X-correction, a function
we denoted by g. The protocol is also schematically shown as Figure 3. Note
that to compute the X correction the conditional presence of the phase gate is
not important: independent of whether f(x, y) equals 1 or 0, we only need to
track the X teleportation corrections that the qubit incurred by being teleported
back-and-forth by Alice and Bob. An efficient garden-hose protocol for g is given
by the following.
Use two pipes for each EPR pair in the protocol, 2GH (f) pairs of 2 pipes
each. Label the top pipe of some pair i by Ii, and the bottom pipe by Xi. We
will iterate over all elements of A, i.e. all performed Bell measurements by Alice.
Consider some element of A, say the k-th pair Ak which consists of {i, j}. If the
corresponding correction bx,k equals 0, we connect the pipe labeled Ii with the
pipe labeled Ij and the pipe labeled Xi with the pipe labeled Xj . Otherwise,
if bx,k equals 1, we connect them crosswise, so we connect Ii with Xj and Xi
with Ij . Finally, the place where the qubit ends up after the protocol is unique
(and is the only unmeasured qubit out of all 2GH (f) EPR pairs). For the set
of open pipes corresponding to that EPR pair, say number i∗, we use one extra
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pipe to which we connect Xi∗ , so that the water ends up at Bob’s side for the
1-output. This garden-hose protocol computes the X correction on the qubit, and
uses 4GH (f) + 1 pipes in total, therefore GH (g) ≤ 4GH (f) + 1.
|ψ〉
EPR pair 1
EPR pair 2
EPR pair 3
ax,1, az,1
ax,2, az,2
bx,1, bz,1
tap
I1
X1
I2
X2
(out if ax,1 ⊕ bx,1 ⊕ ax,2 = 0)
I3
(out if ax,1 ⊕ bx,1 ⊕ ax,2 = 1)
X3
ax,1=0 ax,1=1
ax,2=0 ax,2=1
bx,1=0 bx,1=1
Fig. 3. Example garden-hose protocol to compute the Pauli X incurred by Alice and Bob
teleporting a qubit back-and-forth. When a teleportation requires a Pauli X correction,
the corresponding pipes are connected crosswise, and otherwise they are connected in
parallel.
For the Z-correction we can build a garden-hose protocol using the same idea,
but there is one complication we have to take care of. At the start of the protocol,
there might be an unwanted phase gate present on the state. If some teleportation
is performed before this phase gate is corrected, say by Alice with outcomes
ax, az, then the effective correction can be written as X
axZazP = PXaxZax⊕az .
That is, for the part of the protocol that the unwanted phase gate is present, a
Bell measurement gives a Z-correction whenever the exclusive or of the X- and
Z-outcomes is 1, instead of just when the Z-outcome is 1. We will therefore use
the garden-hose protocol that computes whether f(x, y) = 1, that is, compute
whether the phase gate is present, and then execute a slightly different garden-hose
protocol for each case.
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Unique-output GH protocol
for f(x, y)
(Lemma 1)
Compute correction using
Z outcomes
Compute correction using
X⊕Z outcomes of first part
Compute correction using
Z outcomes of the rest
tap
f(x, y) = 0
f(x, y) = 1
0 1
0 1
Fig. 4. Sketch of garden-hose protocol for the Z correction. The bottom two boxes
use the construction which was used for the X-correction; in the top case using the
Z-outcomes for all measurements, in the bottom case using the parity of the X- and
Z-outcomes for those teleportations that happened before the unwanted phase gate was
removed.
See Figure 4 for an overview of the different parts of this garden-hose protocol
for the Z-correction h. Using Lemma 1 we can transform the garden-hose protocol
for f into a garden-hose protocol for f with unique 0 and 1 outputs at Alice’s
side, of size 3GH (f).8 For the 0 output, that is if there was no unwanted phase
gate present, we can track the Z corrections in exactly the same way as we did
for the X corrections, for a subprotocol of size 4GH (f) + 1. For the 1 output
there was in fact a phase gate present, for the teleportations that happened in
the protocol before the P−1 corrections. For that part of the protocol, we execute
the correction-tracking protocol using the XOR of the X- and Z-measurement
8 If the unique 0 output has to be at Alice’s side, and the unique 1 output at Bob’s
side, the construction uses 3GH (f) + 1 pipes. It is an easy exercise to show that
the construction of Lemma 1 needs one pipe less if Alice wants to have both the
designated 0 output and the 1 output.
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outcomes. For all teleportations after the phase correction, we again track the
correction using just the Z-outcomes, since there is no phase gate present anymore.
This part of the garden-hose protocol also uses 4GH (f) + 1 pipes, for a total of
11GH (f) + 2.
5 Low T-depth quantum circuits
C0
T
C1 Cd−1
T
Cd
T
T · · · T
T T
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
d times
Fig. 5. An example circuit with T-depth d. The Ci gates represent subcircuits consisting
only of operations from the Clifford group C. A layer does not necessarily have a T gate
on all wires.
Theorem 2. Let C be an n-qubit quantum circuit with gates out of the Clif-
ford+T gate set, where C has T-depth d. Then there exists a protocol for two-
party instantaneous non-local computation of C, where each party receives n/2
qubits, which uses a pre-shared entangled state of O( (68n)d ) EPR pairs. That is,
INQC(C) ≤ O( (68n)d ).
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 1, we write the input state |ψ〉, and write the
correct quantum state after step t of the circuit as |ψt〉. At a step t, the circuit
alternates between a layer of T gates9 and a subcircuit consisting of only Clifford
gates, Ct.
The high-level idea of this protocol is as follows. During steps 1 to t, Alice will
hold the entire uncorrected state and performs a layer of the circuit: she performs
a layer of T gates and then a Clifford subcircuit. The Pauli corrections at each
step are a function of earlier teleportation outcomes of both Alice and Bob.
These functions determine for each qubit whether that qubit now has obtained
an unwanted extra P gate when Alice performs the layer of T gates. The players
then, for each qubit, correct this extra gate using Lemma 3 – removing the
unwanted phase gate from the qubit in a way that both players still know its
location.
9 We will assume that for each layer of T gates all wires have a T gate. This is only
done to avoid introducing extra notation needed when instead the gates are only
applied to a subset – the protocol easily generalizes to the more common general
situation.
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At each step we express the corrections as functions of earlier measure-
ments and consider their garden-hose complexity, which is important when using
Lemma 3. The Clifford subcircuit takes the correction functions to the XOR of
several earlier functions. We can bound the growth in garden-hose complexity by
taking XORs using Lemma 2. Taken together, the garden-hose complexity grows
with a factor of at most a constant times n each step.
We will use f tx,i to denote the function that describes the presence of an X
correction on qubit i, at step t of the protocol. Similarly, f tz,i is the function that
describes the Z correction on qubit i at step t. Both will always be functions of
outcomes of earlier teleportation measurements of Alice and Bob. For any t, let
mt be the maximum garden-hose complexity over all the key functions at step t.
Step 0 Bob teleports his qubits, the qubits labeled n/2 up to n, to Alice,
obtaining the measurement outcomes b0x,1, . . . , b
0
x,n/2 and b
0
z,1, . . . , b
0
z,n/2. On
these uncorrected qubits, Alice executes the Clifford subcircuit C0.
Then, since Bob also knows how C0 transforms the keys, the functions
describing the Pauli corrections can all either be described by a single bit of
information which is locally computable by Bob, or are constant and therefore
known by both players. Let f0x,i and f
0
z,i be the resulting key function for any
qubit i. The garden-hose complexity of all these key functions is constant:
GH (f0x,i) ≤ 3 and GH (f0z,i) ≤ 3, and therefore also for the maximum garden-
hose complexity we have m0 ≤ 3.
Step t = 1, . . . , d At the start of the step, the X and Z corrections on any wire
i are given by f t−1x,i and f
t−1
z,i respectively.
Alice applies the T gates on all wires. Any wire i now has an unwanted P if
and only if f tx,i equals 1.
Alice and Bob apply the construction of Lemma 3, which removes this
unwanted phase gate. Let gti be the function describing the extra X correction
incurred by this protocol, so that the new X correction can be written as
f tx,i ⊕ gti . Let hti be the function describing the Z correction, so that the total
Z correction is f tz,i ⊕ hti. The entanglement cost of this protocol is given by
2GH (f tx,i) and the garden-hose complexities of the new functions are at most
GH (gti) ≤ 4GH (f tx,i) + 1 and GH (hti) ≤ 11GH (f tx,i) + 2.
Alice now executes the Clifford subcircuit Ct. The circuit Ct determines
how the current Pauli corrections, i.e. the key functions, transform. For a
specification of the possible transformations, see Section 2.2. These new keys
are formed by taking the exclusive OR of some subset of keys that were
present in the previous step10.
Consider the worst case key for our construction: a key which is given
by the XOR of all keys that were present when the Clifford subcircuit
was executed. Applying Lemma 2, the worst-case key function of the form
10 This is slightly more general than necessary, since not all possible key transformations
of this form are actually possible – only those transformations generated by the
possibilities in Section 2.2 can occur.
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⊕n
i=1 f
t−1
x,i ⊕ gti ⊕ f t−1z,i ⊕ hti has garden-hose complexity at most
mt ≤ 4
(
n∑
i=1
GH (f t−1x,i ) + GH (g
t
i) + GH (f
t−1
z,i ) + GH (h
t
i)
)
+ 1
≤ 4
(
n∑
i=1
GH (f t−1x,i ) + 4GH (f
t−1
x,i ) + 1 + GH (f
t−1
z,i ) + 11GH (f
t−1
x,i ) + 2
)
+ 1
≤ 4
(
n∑
i=1
mt−1 + 4mt−1 + 1 +mt−1 + 11mt−1 + 2
)
+ 1
= 68nmt−1 + 12n+ 1 . (3)
Step d+ 1, final step Alice teleports the last n/2 qubits back to Bob. Alice and
Bob exchange all results of teleportation measurements and locally perform
the needed corrections, using both players’ measurement outcomes.
At every step t, the protocol uses at most 2nmt−1 EPR pairs for the protocol
which corrects the phase gate. Using that m0 ≤ 3, we can write the upper bound
of Equation 3 as the closed form mt ≤ c1(68n)t + c2, with c1 = 216n−268n−1 ≈ 5417
and c2 = 3− 216n−268n−1 ≈ − 317 . The total entanglement use therefore is bounded by∑d
t=1 2nmt−1 ≤ O( (68n)d ).
6 The Interleaved Product protocol
Chakraborty and Leverrier [14] recently proposed a scheme for quantum position
verification based on the interleaved multiplication of unitaries, the Interleaved
Product protocol, denoted by GIP(n, t, ηerr, ηloss). The parameter n concerns the
number of qubits that are involved in the protocol in parallel, while t scales
with the amount of classical information that the protocol uses. Their paper
analyzed several different attacks on this scheme, which all required exponential
entanglement in the parameter t. In this section, as an application of the proof
strategy of Theorem 2, we present an attack on the Interleaved Product protocol
which requires entanglement polynomial in t.
The original protocol is described in terms of the actions of hypothetical honest
parties and also involves checking of timings at spatial locations. For simplicity,
we instead only describe a two-player game, for players Alice and Bob, such that
a high probability of winning this game suffices to break the scheme. Let x be a
string x ∈R {0, 1}n, and let U be a random (single-qubit) unitary operation, i.e.
a random element of U(2). Alice receives t unitaries (ui)
t
i=1, and Bob receives t
unitaries (vi)
t
i=1 such that U =
∏t
i=1 uivi. Alice receives the state U
⊗n|x〉. The
players are allowed one round of simultaneous communication. To break the
protocol GIP(n, t, ηerr, ηloss), after the round of simultaneous communication the
players need to output an identical string y ∈ {∅, 0, 1}n such that the number
of bits where y is different from x is at most ηerrn and the number of empty
results ∅ is at most ηlossn. We will consider attacks on the strongest version of
the protocol, where we take ηloss = 0.
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Theorem 3. There exists an attack on GIP(n, t, ηerr, ηloss = 0) that requires
p(t/ηerr) EPR pairs per qubit of the protocol, for some polynomial p, and succeeds
with high probability.
It was shown in [13] that polynomial garden-hose complexity is equivalent
to log-space computation – up to a local preprocessing of the inputs. Instead of
directly presenting garden-hose protocols, for the current construction it will be
easier to argue about space-bounded algorithms and then using this equivalence
as a black-box translation.
Theorem 4 (Theorem 2.12 of [13]). If f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is
log-space computable, then GH (f) is polynomial in n.
Our attack will involve the computation of the unitary U =
∏t
i=1 uivi in the
garden-hose protocol. This is a simple function, but so far we have only defined
the garden-hose model for functions with a binary output. Therefore we define
an extension of the garden-hose model to functions with a larger output range,
where instead of letting the water exit at Alice’s or Bob’s side, we aim to let the
water exit at correctly labeled pipe. A short proof of the following proposition is
given after the proof of the main theorem.
Proposition 1. Let f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k be a function, such that f is
log-space computable and k is at most O(log k). Then there exists a garden-hose
protocol which uses a polynomial number of pipes, and such that for any input
x, y the water exists at Alice’s side, at a pipe labeled by the output of f(x, y).
We will also need a decomposition of arbitrary unitary operations into the
Clifford+T gate set. The Solovay–Kitaev theorem is a classic result which shows
that any single-qubit quantum gate can be approximated up to precision ε using
O(logc(1/ε)) gates from a finite gate set, where c is approximately equal to 2.
See for example [33] for an exposition of the proof. Our constructions use a
very particular gate set and we are only concerned with the number of T gates
instead of the total number of gates. A recent result by Selinger strengthens the
Solovay–Kitaev theorem for this specific case [36]11.
Theorem 5 (Selinger 2015). Any single-qubit unitary can be approximated,
up to any given error threshold  > 0, by a product of Clifford+T operators with
T-count 11 + 12 log(1/).
With these auxiliary results in place, we can present our attack on the
Interleaved Product protocol.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3). We will describe the actions taken for any single
qubit U |b〉, with b ∈ {0, 1}, such that the probability of error is at most ε. The
protocol will be attacked by performing these actions on each qubit, n times
in parallel. Our construction can be divided in the following four steps. For
operators A,B, let ‖A‖ denote the operator norm, and we use ‖A − B‖ as an
associated distance measure.
11 When the single-qubit unitary is a z-rotation, an even stronger version of the theorem
is available [34].
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1. Construct a (polynomial-sized) garden-hose protocol, with a number of
pipes s, where the qubit is routed to a pipe labeled with a unitary U˜ which
is ε1-close to the total product U .
2. Decompose the unitaries of all labels in terms of the Clifford+T gate set,
using Theorem 5. In particular, we have a Clifford+T circuit C with T-count
k = O(log ε2) such that C is ε2-close to U˜ , and therefore C is at most ε-close
to U , where ε = ε1 + ε2.
3. After executing the garden-hose protocol as a series of teleportations, the state
at pipe U˜ can be approximated by XfxZfzC|ψ〉, with fx and fz functions
of the connections Alice and Bob made in step 1 and their measurement
outcomes. By the construction of Figure 3, described in the proof of Lemma 3,
the garden-hose complexities GH (fx) and GH (fz) are at most linear in s.
We can now alternate between applying a single gate of the circuit C† and
using Lemma 3, k times in total, to obtain a state which only has Pauli
corrections left.
4. After Alice measures this final state, she can broadcast the outcome to Bob.
Alice and Bob also broadcast their inputs and measurement outcomes, which
together determine whether to flip the outcome of Alice’s final measurement.
As the first step, we present a log-space computation solving the following
problem (equivalent to the input of the protocol, with simplified notation): The
input is given by t two-by-two unitary matrices, u1, . . . , ut, and we output a
matrix U˜ such that ‖U˜ − ut . . . u2u1‖ ≤ ε1, where U˜ is encoded using O(log t+
log 1/ε1) bits. We can then use a simple extension of Theorem 4 to transform
this computation to a garden-hose protocol.
Store the current intermediate outcome of the product in the memory of
our computation, using 2` + 2 bits for each entry of the two-by-two matrix,
` + 1 for the real and imaginary part each. Let Mr denote the memory of
our log-space computation after r steps, obtained by computing the product
urMr−1 with rounding. Since the rounded matrix entry has a difference of at
most 2−` with the unrounded entry, we can write the precision loss at each step
as Mr = urMr−1 +∆r, where ∆r is some matrix with all entries absolute value
at most 2−`. Note that ‖∆r‖ ≤ 2−`+1.
The total error incurred by the repeated rounding can now be upper bounded
by
‖Mt − ut . . . u2u1‖ ≤ ‖utMt−1 +∆t − ut . . . u2u1‖
≤ ‖∆t‖+ ‖ut(Mt−1 − ut−1 . . . u2u1)‖
≤ 2−`+1 + ‖Mt−1 − ut−1 . . . u2u1‖
≤ t2−`+1
Here we use that ‖AB‖ ≤ ‖A‖‖B‖ together with the unitarity of all ui. The
final step is by iteratively applying the earlier steps t times. If we choose ` =
log t+ log 1/ε1 + 1 and note that the final output U˜ is given by Mt, we obtain
the bound.
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By application of Proposition 1 we can convert this log-space computation
to a garden-hose protocol, using s pipes, where s is polynomial in ε1 and t. We
then teleport the qubit back-and-forth using Bell measurements given by this
garden-hose protocol.
As second step, we approximate the unitaries that label each output pipe of
the garden-hose protocol of the previous step. In particular, consider the pipe
labeled U˜ , and say we approximate U˜ using a Clifford+T circuit C. By Theorem 5,
we can write C using k = 11 + 12 log(1/ε2) T gates, such that ‖U˜ − C‖ ≤ ε2.
Therefore, defining ε = ε1 + ε2, we have ‖U − C‖ ≤ ε.
We will perform the next steps for all unmeasured qubits (corresponding to
open pipes in the garden-hose model) in parallel. After the simultaneous round
of communication, Alice and Bob are then able to pick the correct qubit and
ignore the others.
Consider the state of the qubit after the teleportations chosen by the garden-
hose protocol. For some functions fx, fz, with inputs Alice’s and Bob’s measure-
ment outcomes, the qubit has state XfxZfzU |b〉. From now on, we will assume
this state is exactly equal to XfxZfzC|b〉 – since U is ε-close to C in the operator
norm, this assumption adds error probability at most 2ε to the final measurement
outcome12.
Write the inverse of this circuit as alternation between gates from the Clifford
group and T gates, C† = CkTCk−1T . . . C1TC0. We will remove C from the
qubit by applying these gates, one by one, by repeated application of Lemma 3.
As convenient shorthand, define the state of the qubit after applying the first r
layers of C†, i.e. up to and including Cr, of C† as
|ψr〉 = T†C†r+1T†Cr+2 . . .T†C†k|b〉 .
In particular, we have CrT|ψr−1〉 = |ψr〉.
By exactly the same construction used in the proof of Lemma 3, shown in
Figure 3, we observe that the garden-hose complexities of the functions fx and
fz is at most 2s+ 1. That is, the protocol uses 2 pipes for all of the s EPR pairs,
and connects them in parallel if the corresponding X- or Z-correction is 0, or
crosswise if the corresponding X- or Z-correction is 1.
We will use divide frx and f
r
z as the functions describing the X and Z corrections
at the end of the step r. Define mr = max{GH (f ix),GH (f iz)} to be the maximum
garden-hose complexity out the of functions describing the X and Z corrections
after step r. After Alice executes the Clifford gate C0, the new key functions
f0x and f
0
z can be written as (the NOT of) an XOR of subsets of the previous
keys, e.g., one of the keys could be fx ⊕ fz. By Lemma 2, we then have that our
starting complexities GH (f0x) and GH (f
0
z ) are at most linear in s.
Now, for any layer r = 1, 2, . . . , k: Our qubit starts in the state Xf
r−1
x Zf
r−1
z |ψr−1〉,
for some functions fr−1x , f
r−1
z that each have garden-hose complexity at most
mr−1. After Alice performs a T gate, the qubit is in the state
TXf
r−1
x Zf
r−1
z |ψr−1〉 = Pfr−1x Xfr−1x Zfr−1z T|ψr−1〉 .
12 See for instance [33, Box 4.1] for a computation of this added error.
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Now, we apply Lemma 3, costing 2GH (fr−1x ) EPR pairs, so that Alice has the
state
Xf
r−1
x ⊕grZf
r−1
z ⊕hrT|ψr−1〉 ,
for some functions gr and hr that depend on the measurement results by Alice and
Bob. We have that GH (gr) ≤ 4GH (fr−1x ) + 1 and GH (gr) ≤ 11GH (fr−1x ) + 2.
Now Alice applies the Clifford group gate Cr, so that the state becomes
CrX
fr−1x ⊕grZf
r−1
z ⊕hrT|ψr−1〉 = XfrxZfrz |ψr〉 .
The functions frx and f
r
z can be expressed as XOR of the functions f
r−1
x , f
r−1
y ,
gr, hr. These functions have garden-hose complexity respectively at most mr−1,
mr−1, 4mr−1 + 1 and 11mr−1 + 2. By application of Lemma 2, the exclusive
OR of these functions therefore at most has garden-hose complexity mr ≤
4(mr−1 +mr−1 + 4mr−1 + 1 + 11mr−1 + 2) + 1 = 68mr−1 + 13.
Finally, after application of the gates in C†, Alice has a qubit in a state which
is ε-close to Xf
r
xZf
r
z |b〉. Measurement in the computational basis will produce
outcome b⊕ frx with high probability. Besides this final measurement, Alice and
Bob both broadcast all teleportation measurement outcomes in their step of
simultaneous communication. From these outcomes they can each locally compute
frx and so derive the bit b from the outcome, which equals b⊕ frx , breaking the
protocol.
Our total entanglement usage is s for the first step, and then for each of the
at most s output pipes, Alice performs the rest of the protocol. For the part of
the protocol that undoes the unitary U , we use at most 2
∑k−1
r=0 mr EPR pairs
(for each of the at most s output pipes of the first part). We have m0 ≤ O(s)
and mr ≤ m0 · 2O(k). Since s is polynomial in t and ε1 and k = O(log ε2), the
total protocol uses entanglement polynomial in t and ε.
Our attack replaces the exponential dependence on t of the attacks presented
in [14] by a polynomial dependence. For the case of ηerr = 0, we would need
an error per qubit of around εn to achieve total error at most ε. In that case,
the entanglement required still grows as a polynomial, now with a super-linear
dependence of both parameters n and t.
Only the first step of our attack, i.e. the garden-hose protocol which computes
a unitary from the inputs of the players, is specific to the interleaved product
protocol. This attack can therefore be seen as a blueprint for attacks on a larger
class of protocols: any protocol of this same form, where the unitary operation
chosen depends on a log-space computable function with classical inputs, can
be attacked with entanglement which scales as a polynomial in the size of the
classical inputs.
Proof (Proof of Proposition 1). We can split up the computation f : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}k into k functions that each compute a bit, f1, . . . , fk. Since f is
a log-space computation, each of these functions is also a log-space computation
and therefore has a polynomial-size garden-hose protocol by Theorem 4. Using
Lemma 1, we can with linear overhead transform each of these protocol into
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a unique-output protocol, so that the water flows out at a unique pipe when
the function is 0 and another unique pipe when the function is 1. Let p be a
polynomial so that the single-output garden-hose protocol of each function fi
uses pipes at most p(n).
First use the protocol for f1, with output pipes labeled 0 and 1. Now each
of these output pipes we feed into their own copy of f2. The 0 output of the
first copy we label 00 and its 1 output 10. Similarly, we label the 0 output of
the second copy 01 and the 1 output we label 11. By recursively continuing this
construction, we build a garden-hose protocol for the function f which uses s
pipes, where s is at most
s ≤
k∑
i=1
2i−1p(n) ≤ 2kp(n) .
Since we have taken k = O(log n), this construction uses a number of pipes
polynomial in n.
7 Discussion
We combined ideas from the garden-hose model with techniques from quantum
cryptography to find a class of quantum circuits for which instantaneous non-local
computation is efficient. These constructions can be used as attacks on protocols
for quantum position-verification, and could also be translated back into the
settings related to physics (most notable the relation between the constraints of
relativity theory and quantum measurements) and distributed computing.
The resource usage of instantaneous non-local quantum computation quantifies
the non-locality present in a bi- or multi-partite quantum operation, and there is
still room for new upper and lower bounds. Any such bounds will result in new
insights, both in terms of position-based quantum cryptography, but also in the
other mentioned settings.
Some possible approaches for continuing this line of research are as follows:
– Computing the Pauli corrections happens without error in our current con-
struction. Perhaps introducing randomness and a small probability of error –
or the usage of entanglement as given in the quantum garden-hose model of
[13, Section 2.5] – could make this scheme more efficient.
– Future research might be able to extend this type of construction to a wider
gate set or model of computation. One could think for example of a Clif-
ford+cyclotomic gate set [20], match-gate computation [27], or measurement-
based quantum computation [6,9].
– We presented an attack on the Interleaved Product protocol which required
entanglement polynomial in t. Since the exponent of this polynomial was
quite large, the scheme could still be secure under realistic assumptions.
Since the parameter t concerns the classical information that the verifiers
send, requiring attackers to manipulate an amount of entanglement which
scales linearly with the classical information would already make a scheme
unpractical to break in practice – let alone a quadratic or cubic dependence.
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– The combination of the garden-hose model with the tool set of blind quantum
computation is potentially powerful in other settings. For example, following
up on Broadbent and Jeffery who published constructions for quantum
homomorphic encryption for circuits of low T-gate complexity [10], Dulek,
Speelman, and Schaffner [17] developed a scheme for quantum homomorphic
encryption, based on this combination as presented in (a preprint of) this
work.
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A Definition of INQC
An instantaneous non-local quantum protocol that uses k qubits of entanglement
is a protocol of the following form.
Alice and Bob start with a fixed, chosen 2k-qubit state ηAeBe ∈ C2
k ⊗ C2k ,
the entanglement. (Our protocols all use the special case where this state is
a tensor product of k EPR pairs.) The players receive an input state ρ ∈
S(Ain⊗Bin), where S(A) is used for the set of density matrices on some Hilbert
space A. Let Am, As, Bm, As denote arbitrary-sized quantum registers. Alice
applies some quantum operation, i.e. completely positive trace-preserving map,
A∞ : S(Ain ⊗ Ae) → S(Am ⊗ As) and Bob applies the quantum operation
B∞ : S(Bin ⊗ Be) → S(Bm ⊗ Bs). Alice sends the register As to Bob, while
simultaneously Bob sends Bs to Alice.
Afterwards Alice applies the quantum operation A∈ : S(Am⊗Bs)→ S(Aout)
on her memory and the state she received from Bob, and outputs the result.
Likewise Bob applies the operation B∈ : S(Bm ⊗As)→ S(Bout) on the part of
the quantum state he kept and outputs the result of this operation.
Definition 1. Let Φ : S(Ain ⊗ Bin) → S(Aout ⊗ Bout) be a bipartite quantum
operation, i.e. a completely positive trace-preserving map, for some input registers
Ain, Bin and output registers Aout, Bout.
We say that INQCε(Φ) is the smallest number k such that there exists an
instantaneous non-local quantum protocol that uses k qubits of entanglement, with
induced channel Ψ : S(Ain ⊗Bin)→ S(Aout ⊗Bout), so that ‖Φ− Ψ‖ ≤ ε.
For any unitary U , we write INQCε(U) as a shorthand for INQCε(ΦU ), where
ΦU is the induced quantum operation defined by ρAB → UρABU†. In this paper,
we assume for simplicity that Alice’s and Bob’s input and output registers all
consist of n qubits.
These definitions are mostly compatible with those given in [5], but differ
in two ways – both are unimportant for our results in this paper, but might
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be relevant for follow-up results, especially when proving lower bounds. Firstly,
we made the choice for generality to allow the players to communicate using
qubits, instead of just classical messages. As long as the number of communicated
qubits is not too large, quantum communication could potentially be replaced by
classical communication using teleportation, at the cost of extra entanglement
– the counted resource. Secondly, we make the choice to explicitly separate the
shared entangled state from the local memory in notation – Beigi and Ko¨nig split
the state in a measured and unmeasured part, but do not introduce notation for
(free) extra local memory in addition to the shared entangled state.
Whether these choices are reasonable or not will also depend on the exact
application. Since we mostly think about applications to position-based quantum
cryptography, giving the players, i.e. ‘attackers’, as much power as possible seems
the most natural.
B The Clifford hierarchy
The Clifford hierarchy, also called the Gottesman–Chuang hierarchy, generalizes
the definition of the Clifford group of Equation 1 in the following way [24]. Define
C1 = P , the first level of the hierarchy, as the Pauli group. Recursively define the
k-th level as
Ck = {U ∈ U(2n) | ∀σ ∈ P : UσU† ∈ Ck−1} .
Then C2 is the Clifford group and the next levels consist of increasingly more
quantum operations – although for k ≥ 3 the set Ck is no longer a group [41].
The method behind the protocol of Theorem 1 immediately translates to the
related setting of the Clifford hierarchy. Since the dependence on n is exponential,
Proposition 2 will only be a qualitative improvement over Beigi and Ko¨nig’s
port-based teleportation construction when both n and the level k are small.
The results of Chakraborty and Leverrier [14] contain a complete proof of
Proposition 2, proven independently and made available earlier than (the preprint
of) the current paper. We still include a proof of the statement as an illustrative
application of the proof technique of Section 3.
Proposition 2. Let U be an n-qubit operation in the k-th level of the Clifford
hierarchy, where Alice receives n/2 qubits and Bob receives n/2 qubits, then
INQC(U) ≤ O(n4nk).
Proof (Proof sketch). First Bob teleports his qubits to Alice, with n outcomes for
X and Z. Alice applies U to the uncorrected state, so that now the state equals
UXbxZbz |ψ〉 = Vbx,bzU |ψ〉, where Vbx,bz is an operator in the (k − 1)-th level of
the Clifford hierarchy. Exactly which operator depends on Bob’s measurement
outcomes bx, bz.
Alice teleports the entire state to Bob, with outcomes ax, az, and Bob applies
the inverse V †bx,bz , so that the state is
V †bx,bzX
axZazVbx,bzU |ψ〉 = Wax,az,bx,bzU |ψ〉 ,
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with Wax,az,bx,bz in the (k−2)-th level of the Clifford hierarchy. For every possible
value of bx, bz, the players share a set of n EPR pairs. Bob teleports the state using
the set labeled with his measurement outcome bx, bz, obtaining teleportation
corrections bˆx, bˆz.
For every set the players repeat this protocol recursively, in the follow-
ing way. For any set, Alice repeats the protocol as if it were the set used by
Bob. At the correct set, Alice effectively knows the values bx, bz from the la-
bel, and ax, az she knows as own measurement outcomes. The state present is
XbˆxZbˆzWax,az,bx,bzU |ψ〉. When Alice applies W †ax,az,bx,bz , the state is given by
Fax,az,bx,bz,bˆx,bˆzU |ψ〉, with F in the (k − 3)-th level of the Clifford hierarchy. Of
this state, effectively only bˆx, bˆz is unknown to Alice. Alice teleports this state to
Bob using the EPR pairs labeled with ax, az, and the recursive step is complete.
The players continue these steps until the first level of the hierarchy is reached
– formed by Pauli operators – after which they can exchange the outcomes of
their measurements to undo these and obtain U |ψ〉.
After t steps, Every teleportation step after the first uses a set of n EPR
pairs, picked out of 4n possibilities corresponding to the Pauli correction of the
n qubits teleported in the previous step.
Summing over all rounds gives a total entanglement use of n
∑k
t=1 4
nt =
O(n4nk).
C Proof of Lemma 2: Garden-hose protocols for XOR of
functions
To prove: Let (f1, f2, . . . , fk) be functions, where each function fi has garden-
hose complexity GH (fi). Let c ∈ {0, 1} be an arbitrary bit that is 0 or 1. Then,
GH
(
c⊕
k⊕
i=1
fi
)
≤ 4
k∑
i=1
GH (fi) + 1 .
Proof (Proof sketch). This statement was proven by Klauck and Podder [29,
Theorem 18] in a more general form, using the following two steps: First, any
garden-hose protocol can be turned into a single-output garden-hose protocol,
repeated in this paper as Lemma 1, such that the new complexity is at most
three times the old complexity. Then, these single-output garden-hose protocols
can be used as nodes in a permutation branching program. Our current case is
simply an instantiation of that proof for the particular case of the exclusive OR,
together with the observation that we can combine both steps into one for this
particular case.
For all functions fi we build a gadget with two input pipes and two output
pipes, such that if the water flows in at input pipe labeled b ∈ {0, 1}, it flows out
at the pipe labeled fi ⊕ b. See Figure 6 for an overview. We use four copies of
the garden-hose protocol for fi.
The open 0 output pipes of the protocol for fi in copy 0-INi are connected
to the open 0 output pipes in copy 0-OUTi. The designated source pipe of the
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original protocol for fi in copy 0-OUTi is then guaranteed to be the output.
13
We similarly connect the 1 outputs of 0-INi to the 1 outputs of 1-OUTi. This
construction, i.e. before adding the 1-IN copy, is exactly the method used to
create a single-output protocol. We connect the open 0 pipes of 1-INi to the open
0 pipes of 1-OUTi and the open 1 pipes of the open 1 pipes of 1-INi to the open
1 pipes of 0-OUTi.
The gadget then works as claimed by direct inspection. Since all four copies
are wired exactly the same, the path of the water through the ‘OUT’ copy is the
reverse of the path it followed through the ‘IN’ copy, and therefore the water will
exit correctly – at the pipe which was the source of the original protocol.
protocol
for fi
0-INi
protocol
for fi
1-INi
protocol
for fi
0-OUTi
protocol
for fi
1-OUTi
0 in 1 in
0 out 1 out
Fig. 6. XOR gadget for any function fi, total complexity 4GH (fi).
References
1. Scott Aaronson and Daniel Gottesman. Improved simulation of stabilizer circuits.
Physical Review A, 70(5):052328, 2004.
13 This same trick is used in the proof of Lemma 1 in [29, Lemma 11] and in our proof
of Lemma 3.
26
2. Matthew Amy, Dmitri Maslov, and Michele Mosca. Polynomial-time T-depth
optimization of Clifford+T circuits via matroid partitioning. Computer-Aided
Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 33(10):1476–
1489, Oct 2014. doi:10.1109/TCAD.2014.2341953.
3. Matthew Amy, Dmitri Maslov, Michele Mosca, and Martin Roetteler. A meet-in-
the-middle algorithm for fast synthesis of depth-optimal quantum circuits. Trans.
Comp.-Aided Des. Integ. Cir. Sys., 32(6):818–830, June 2013. doi:10.1109/TCAD.
2013.2244643.
4. Pablo Arrighi and Louis Salvail. Blind quantum computation. International Journal
of Quantum Information, 4(05):883–898, 2006.
5. Salman Beigi and Robert Ko¨nig. Simplified instantaneous non-local quantum
computation with applications to position-based cryptography. New Journal of
Physics, 13(9):093036, 2011.
6. HJ Briegel, DE Browne, W Du¨r, R Raussendorf, and M Van den Nest. Measurement-
based quantum computation. Nature Physics, 5(1):19–26, 2009.
7. Anne Broadbent. Delegating private quantum computations. Canadian Journal of
Physics, 93(9):941–946, 2015. doi:10.1139/cjp-2015-0030.
8. Anne Broadbent. Popescu–Rohrlich correlations imply efficient instantaneous
nonlocal quantum computation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.04930, 2015.
9. Anne Broadbent, Joseph Fitzsimons, and Elham Kashefi. Universal blind quantum
computation. In Foundations of Computer Science, 2009. FOCS’09. 50th Annual
IEEE Symposium on, pages 517–526. IEEE, 2009.
10. Anne Broadbent and Stacey Jeffery. Quantum homomorphic encryption for
circuits of low T-gate complexity. In Rosario Gennaro and Matthew Rob-
shaw, editors, Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2015, volume 9216 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, pages 609–629. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015.
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_30.
11. H. Buhrman, R. Cleve, M. Laurent, N. Linden, A. Schrijver, and F. Unger. New
limits on fault-tolerant quantum computation. In Foundations of Computer Science,
2006. FOCS ’06. 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on, pages 411–419, Oct 2006.
doi:10.1109/FOCS.2006.50.
12. Harry Buhrman, Nishanth Chandran, Serge Fehr, Ran Gelles, Vipul Goyal, Rafail
Ostrovsky, and Christian Schaffner. Position-based quantum cryptography: Impos-
sibility and constructions. In Phillip Rogaway, editor, Advances in Cryptology -
CRYPTO 2011, volume 6841 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 429–446.
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2011.
13. Harry Buhrman, Serge Fehr, Christian Schaffner, and Florian Speelman. The garden-
hose model. In Proceedings of the 4th Conference on Innovations in Theoretical
Computer Science, ITCS ’13, pages 145–158, New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM.
doi:10.1145/2422436.2422455.
14. Kaushik Chakraborty and Anthony Leverrier. Practical position-based quantum
cryptography. Phys. Rev. A, 92:052304, Nov 2015. doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.92.
052304.
15. Andrew M Childs. Secure assisted quantum computation. Quantum Information &
Computation, 5(6):456–466, 2005.
16. S R Clark, A J Connor, D Jaksch, and S Popescu. Entanglement consumption of in-
stantaneous nonlocal quantum measurements. New Journal of Physics, 12(8):083034,
2010. URL: http://stacks.iop.org/1367-2630/12/i=8/a=083034.
17. Yfke Dulek, Christian Schaffner, and Florian Speelman. Quantum homomorphic
encryption for polynomial-sized circuits. arXiv preprint arXiv:1603.09717, 2016.
27
18. Fre´de´ric Dupuis, Jesper Buus Nielsen, and Louis Salvail. Secure two-party quantum
evaluation of unitaries against specious adversaries. In CRYPTO, pages 685–706,
September 2010. arXiv:1009.2096, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14623-7_37.
19. KAG Fisher, A Broadbent, LK Shalm, Z Yan, J Lavoie, R Prevedel, T Jennewein,
and KJ Resch. Quantum computing on encrypted data. Nature communications, 5,
2014.
20. Simon Forest, David Gosset, Vadym Kliuchnikov, and David McKinnon. Exact
synthesis of single-qubit unitaries over Clifford-cyclotomic gate sets. Journal of Math-
ematical Physics, 56(8):–, 2015. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.4927100.
21. Brett Giles and Peter Selinger. Exact synthesis of multiqubit Clifford+T circuits.
Physical Review A, 87(3):032332, 2013.
22. Daniel Gottesman. The Heisenberg representation of quantum computers. In Group
theoretical methods in physics. Proceedings, 22nd International Colloquium, Group22,
ICGTMP’98, Hobart, Australia, July 13-17, 1998, 1998. arXiv:quant-ph/9807006.
23. Daniel Gottesman. Theory of fault-tolerant quantum computation. Phys. Rev. A,
57:127–137, Jan 1998. doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.57.127.
24. Daniel Gottesman and Isaac L. Chuang. Quantum Teleportation is a Universal
Computational Primitive. Nature, 402:390–393, August 1999. arXiv:9908010,
doi:10.1038/46503.
25. Satoshi Ishizaka and Tohya Hiroshima. Asymptotic teleportation scheme as a
universal programmable quantum processor. Phys. Rev. Lett., 101(24):240501, Dec
2008. doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.101.240501.
26. Satoshi Ishizaka and Tohya Hiroshima. Quantum teleportation scheme by selecting
one of multiple output ports. Phys. Rev. A, 79(4):042306, Apr 2009. doi:10.1103/
PhysRevA.79.042306.
27. Richard Jozsa, Barbara Kraus, Akimasa Miyake, and John Watrous. Matchgate
and space-bounded quantum computations are equivalent. In Proceedings of the
Royal Society of London A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences, page
rspa20090433. The Royal Society, 2009.
28. Adrian Kent, William J. Munro, and Timothy P. Spiller. Quantum tagging: Au-
thenticating location via quantum information and relativistic signaling constraints.
Phys. Rev. A, 84:012326, Jul 2011. doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.84.012326.
29. Hartmut Klauck and Supartha Podder. New bounds for the garden-hose model.
In Venkatesh Raman and S. P. Suresh, editors, 34th International Conference on
Foundation of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS
2014), volume 29 of Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs),
pages 481–492, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2014. Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer
Informatik. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2014.481.
30. Vadym Kliuchnikov, Dmitri Maslov, and Michele Mosca. Fast and efficient exact
synthesis of single-qubit unitaries generated by Clifford and T gates. Quantum
Info. Comput., 13(7-8):607–630, July 2013.
31. Hoi-Kwan Lau and Hoi-Kwong Lo. Insecurity of position-based quantum-
cryptography protocols against entanglement attacks. Phys. Rev. A, 83(1):012322,
Jan 2011. doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.83.012322.
32. Gabriele Nebe, Eric M. Rains, and Neil J. A. Sloane. The invariants of the Clifford
groups. Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 24(1):99–122, 2001. doi:10.1023/A:
1011233615437.
33. Michael A. Nielsen and Isaac L. Chuang. Quantum Computation and Quantum
Information. Cambridge university press, 2000.
34. Neil J Ross and Peter Selinger. Optimal ancilla-free Clifford+T approximation of
z-rotations. arXiv preprint arXiv:1403.2975, 2014.
28
35. Peter Selinger. Quantum circuits of T-depth one. Physical Review A, 87(4):042302,
2013.
36. Peter Selinger. Efficient Clifford+T approximation of single-qubit operators. Quan-
tum Information & Computation, 15(1-2):159–180, January 2015.
37. Florian Speelman. Position-based quantum cryptography and the garden-hose
game. Master’s thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2011.
38. Lev Vaidman. Instantaneous measurement of nonlocal variables. Phys. Rev. Lett.,
90(1):010402, Jan 2003. doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.90.010402.
39. Li Yu. Fast controlled unitary protocols using group or quasigroup structures.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1112.0307, 2011.
40. Li Yu, Robert B Griffiths, and Scott M Cohen. Fast protocols for local implemen-
tation of bipartite nonlocal unitaries. Physical Review A, 85(1):012304, 2012.
41. Bei Zeng, Xie Chen, and Isaac L Chuang. Semi-Clifford operations, structure of Ck
hierarchy, and gate complexity for fault-tolerant quantum computation. Physical
Review A, 77(4):042313, 2008.
29
